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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

EARL SAMPSON and LERLYNN C.
SAMPSON, his wife; GULF OIL
CORPORATION; FIRST STATE
BANK OF SALINA,

CASE NO. 14323

Defendants- Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action in condemnation by the Utah State Road
Commission to acquire 3. 21 acres of land located in Salina City,
Sevier County, Utah for the purpose of constructing a portion of
Interstate Highway 1-70.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury on the issue of just compensation
to be awarded for the taking and damaging of respondents' properties
which resulted in a judgment on the verdict in the sum of $63, 000.
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The State of Utah made a motion for a new trial which was denied
by the trial judge.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
M

R" stands for record.

,,

TRM stands for transcript of record.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The landowners, Earl Sampson and Lerlynn Sampson, his wife,
long-time residents of Salina, Utah, acquired approximately seven
acres of land and developed a dairy business upon said property in
the year 1958 (TR. 40). This dairy was in continuous and full
operation from 1958 until the date of condemnation. The property
was fully fenced with steel posts, net fencing, and barbed wire and
was located within the corporate limits of Salina City (TR 21, 22, 70, 71).
There had been constructed upon the land various improvements
consisting of a modern cinder block milking parlor, corrals, lounging
sheds, pens, mangers, concrete pads, water troughs, and a concrete
silage pit (TR. 21-40). At the date of taking the property was zoned
residential, although it had a permissive use for dairy operation
based upon its long existence (TR. 71>. A substantial protion of the
property fronted on a hard-surfaced city street and was serviced by
electricity, city culinary water, and city sewer system (TR. 21,22,67)
(Exhibit P-i).
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On November 1, 1974, the Utah Road Commission filed a complaint in the District Court of Sevier County, State of Utah to condemn
3.21 acres of the subject property for highway development (R. I); and
the area of take ran approximately through the middle of the sevenacre tract (TR. 40, 81, 82^ (Ex. P-l). Included in the area condemned
were substantial portions of the corrals, lounging sheds, mangers,
water troughs, concrete pads, bull pen, and fencing (TR. 40, 81, 83).
As a consequence of the taking, the concrete silage pit and approximately
one acre of land on the east side of the condemned parcel were severed
and left in a'landlockecT condition (TR. 45, 94) (Ex. P-l). The dairy
operation, of necessity, was terminated; and the remainder of the
improvements located outside of the area of the taking were rendered
useless and of no value (TR. 40, 45, 8l-83>. At the date of condemnation
Mr. Sampson was maintaining a dairy herd of approximately fifty
milking cows and fifty dry cows fTR. 70, 83>.
The case proceeded to trial on the issue of damages and, in
essence, the testimony relative to dollar amount illicited is summarized
in the Statement of Facts set forth by the appellant in its brief.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict as
follows:
,f

. . . Market value of property taken by the State
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$16, 050

"Damages, if any, to remaining land and improvements
by reason of severence

„ A ^ J J ^ _ ~

..i?A£°£.lf

."Total judgment
(R. 25).

Appellant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial which,
after argument, was denied by the trial judge.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT IS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE GREATER
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
The appellant concedes that the verdict of $46, 950 for severence
damages is within the range of the "expert" testimony and does not
challenge that portion of the verdict (Page 5 of Appellant's brief).
An analysis of appellant's argument indicates that their position
is predicated upon the theory that the testimony given by a property
owner in a condemnation action is not competent evidence which can
support a verdict; that only the testimony of an "expert" will support
such a verdict, and that in the instant case there was no evidence
other than that of the landowner to support the portion of the verdict
dealing with the award rendered for market value of property taken.
We do not and cannot agree with such a position in the light of the
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evidence and applicable law. It would appear that appellant contends
that the property owner should be extended the courtesy of telling
the jury what he thinks his property is worth and what amount, if
any, his properties have been damaged; but that if it should happen
that a jury accepts such testimony, it should then be immediately
withdrawn and the landowner advised that his testimony really carries
no weight at all.
At page 12 of appellant's brief, it is stated: / T h e fact that Mr.
Sampson had been in the dairy business for a great number of years
may have qualified him as an expert concerning the operation of the
dairy, the cost of such an operation, the value Of and replacement
cost of the milking parlor and other improvements... " (Emphasis
added), yet they challenge this same witness' qualifications to testify
relative to the value of the land upon which such improvements have
been constructed, occupied, and maintained for nearly 17 years. If
the landowner is admittedly qualified to testify as to the value of the
improvements and knowledgeable on such matters of importance,
how can appellants logically contend that the same witness is totally
lacking in the qualification and knowledge relative to the value of the
land upon which such improvements exist?
•

*

.

.

Mr. Sampson testified that he had owned and operated the subject
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land and dairy business since 1958 and gave detailed testimony relative
to the nature and extent of the land and improvements with which we
are concerned (TR. 21-44). in further support of the testimony which
he gave concerning the value of his raw land, he testified that he had
made inquiries of other property owners and had investigated other
sales. He found that a parcel of land located immediately east and
across the creek from his property had sold for $5, 000 per acre.
This land had none of the amenities of sewer, water, or hard-surface
streets, such as his property enjoyed, and had been previously used
as an alfalfa farm (TR. 41, 42, 43, 52, 53). Such sale was further corroborated by the expert witness for the landowner, who identified this
sale as having occured in 1973 (TR. 75,76).
It is of interest to note that with the exception of the aforementioned
sale in 1973, none of the "expert" witnesses were able to find truly
comparable sales and relied upon sales of agricultural land located
primarily outside the city limits, with little or no utilities available
(TR. 73-76, 125-127, 201-206). In one instance the State f s witness,
Mr. Adams, used as one of his comparable sales a parcel of land
covered with salt grass, which had no sewer, water, or electricity
and fronted on a gravel lane; and due to its location, was acquired
by the City of Saiina as a site for a sewer lagoon (TR. 201-206). To
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contend that the landowner's testimony has no weight and should be
totally disregarded smacks of total absurdity when tested in the light
of the comparable sales relied upon by the other witnesses.
At page 5 and 6 of appellant's brief, it is stated that the landowner "testified that the land taken had a value of $60, 000." We
believe this to be an obvious, unintentional error as nowhere in the
record does such testimony exist.
The total jury verdict was the same amount as the sum testified
to by Memory Cain, expert appraiser for the landowners.
At first glance, one might well assume that the jury arrived
at this verdict of $63, 000 by adopting the testimony of Mr. Cain.
However, upon a more careful analysis of the verdict, we find that
the jury did not adopt the exact testimony of any witness with respect
to the $46, 950 severance damages, but selected and arrived at that
amount after careful deliberation, which sum was within the range
of the expert testimony. One, by the same process of analysis, might
assume that the jury arrived at its verdict for the value of the "property
taken" by adopting one segment of Mr. Sampson's testimony. To do
so would, in our opinion, be fraught with the same obvious unwarranted
assumption and constitute an unwarranted invasion upon the rights of
the jury, it is important to keep in m'irri that involved in the "taking"
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was not only 3.21 acres of raw land but also a substantial portion of
the improvements which consisted of corrals, lounging sheds, mangers,
loading chutes, concrete slabs, water troughs, and fencing (Ex. P-l)
(TR. 36, 45, 68-69, 83, 193). The expert testimony relative to the
value placed upon the improvements taken, exclusive of land, ranged
from a low of $2, 637 as testified to by State witness, Harry Dyson,
(TR. 135), to a high of $12, 096 as testified to by State witness, Aldon
Adams (TR. 185-194), with the landowner's expert witness at $4, 387
(TR. 96-97). With such a variation and range of testimony, it is impossible to say how the jury arrived at the figure of $16, 050 except by pure
conjecture and speculation.
Counsel for the appellant did not object to the landowner's
testimony at the time of trial and cross-examined him in detail relative
to his knowledge of the value of his land and improvements, thus giving
the jury a full opportunity to weigh his testimony (TR. 50-57).
This court has long recognized the principle that where there
exists any reasonable combination of testimony to support a verdict,
the same should not be disturbed.
In the case of Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v.
Nelson, 11 Utah 2d 253', 358 P. 2d 81, this court said:
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M

.. .The jury was entitled to believe
or disbelieve in part or in whole the
testimony of the two appraisers.
Regardless of how arrived at, the jury
chose the 'before1 value of plaintiffs
appraiser and the 'after' value of defendants' appraiser. Presumptions and
intendments cannot be indulged in to
establish a contradiction or inconsistency in the findings or answers of a
jury to special interrogatories, the
presumption being always to the contrary. And this court cannot go behind
the answers and analyze or speculate
as to the process by which the jury
arrived at them."
See also Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P. 2d 622
89 C.J. S. Trial § 562, p. 324.
This principle of law was again pronounced in the recent case
of City of Tucson v. Gastelum, 541 P. 2d 590 (Ariz.-Oct. 1975) wherein
that court said:
" . . .There were no special interrogatories
submitted to the jury. We do not know how it
arrived at its estimate of severence damages.
Appellant's calculations are sheer speculation. Where the amount of damages or the
value of property is concerned, and where
witness pick varying sums as proper estimates of damages or the value of the property
the trial court and the jury are not bound to
fix the verdict or judgment at the exact sum
testified to by any one of the witnesses, especially when the conclusions are based upon
many factors. They may instead take part
of the necessary factors from the testimony
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of one witness and part from that of
another and reach a result anywhere
between the highest and lowest estimate which may be arrived at by using
the value factors appearing in the testimony. Any combination which is
reasonable will be sustained by the
trial court. M
Appellant has cited the case of State Road Commission v.
Silliman, 22 Utah 2d 33, 448 P. 2d 347, ostensibly to show that a
litigant is bound by the testimony of "expert" witnesses only. Appellant would like the Silliman case to say that an owner's testimony of
damages in a condemnation case could never form the basis to support
a jury's finding. However, in the Silliman case the verdict for severance damages exceeded the highest figure of any witness (including
the landowner). This court held the verdict was therefore excessive
"as a matter of law." It instructed that otherwise the verdict could
not be set aside unless so excessive as to be shocking to one's conscience. The Silliman case too presented a factual situation entirely
different from the case at bar.
The State Road Commission would like to have this court construe
the ruling in the case of Utah State Road Commission v. The Steele
Ranch, 533 P.2d 888 (Utah 1975), to say that in ail condemnation actions
a jury verdict cannot stand if it exceeds the highest "expert" testimony
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and that the testimony of the landowner will not support such a verdict.
A careful reading of The Steele Ranch case clearly distinguishes that
case from the instant action and presents a factual situation substantially different.

At issue in Hie Steele Ranch case was the determination

of the more sophisticated question of severance damages, an issue
generally considered more complicated and difficult of ascertainment
than a determination of damages resulting from a "take. ff

Further-

more, there existed a lack of unity of title to the properties which
were involved in The Steele Ranch case, which caused this court to
comment:
M

.-.. • Along with the foregoing is to be
considered a further difficulty; that the
manner in which the case was submitted
to the jury permitted them to appraise
the severance damages, not only to the
remainder of the ranch property but also
the adverse effect upon the resident's
property;.."
M
. . . An view of the frailties we have discussed above concerning the evidence as
to severence damages and the manner in
which the jury was allowed to consider ft,
I t is our conclusion that there is not alTu?~
ficiently sound foundation that the award
of $75, 000 can fairly and justly be regarded
as being supported by substantial evidence. M
(Emphasis added)
This court, in a'long line of cases, has consistently held with
the great weight of authority that a landowner is a competent witness
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to testify concerning the value of his property taken and damaged
in an action under the law of eminent domain. See Salt Lake & U. R.
Co. v. Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189 Pac. 90, 92 (1920); Provo River
Water Users Assn. v. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 133 P. 2d 777; State
Road Commission v. Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 184, 478 P. 2d 507. Similarly
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the right of a property
owner to testify concerning the value of property which he occupies
and operates. Teiluride Power Co. v. Williams, 164 F.2d 685
(Tenth Circuit, 1947). See also San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit
District v. McKeegan, 71 Cal Rptr. 204 (1968); State of New Mexico
v. Chavez, 80 N. M. 394, 456 P. 2d 868, 870 (1969); United States v.
3,698.63 Acres of Land, Burleigh, Emmons & Morton Counties, State
of North Dakota, 416 F. 2d 65, 66 (Eighth Circuit 1969).
It was observed in the Schramm case, Supra, that:
"In cases like the one under consideration
the qualification of witnesses to express an
opinion as to market value necessarily is a
question to be largely determined by the
trial judge. If it is shown that the witness
is competent to express an opinion as to
values, no matter what the source of the
qualifying information may be, he should
be permitted to testify. The sources of the
witnesses' information may vary according
to the peculiar means of opportunity the
witness has of forming an opinion and judging
the premises all her life, and has been interested
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and alert in making inquiry as to
its value, may not be as well qualified to speak as the banker, lawyer,
or real estate man, having more or
less to do with sales and transfers of
real property. The means and extent
of the knowledge of any witness may
be gone into on cross-examination,
and rebutted by the testimony of other
competent witnesses, whose opinions
may differ as to value. No rule can
be formulated for determining the
means by which a witness shall acquire
the necessary knowledge to qualify him
to speak that will apply in all cases, if,
under all the circumstances, he was in
a position to obtain knowledge and form
a correct judgment as to values, whether
or not buying, selling, leasing, or using
the property for purposes for which it
is adaptable is immaterial, so long as
the jury is given the benefit of the facts
upon which the opinion of the witness is
based. M (citing authority)
This issue was before the New Mexico Supreme Court in the
case of State of New Mexico v. Chavez, 80 N. M. 394, 456 P. 2d 868,
870. In adopting the rule permitting such testimony, the court stated:
"Appellant concedes that the prevailing
rule permits an owner to testify concerning
the value of his land both before and after
a taking by condemnation (citing authority),
It argues, however, that because the rule
has been stated as one of practical necessity. ***we should adopt the rule followed
by a minority of jurisdictions which denies
the right of an owner to testify concerning
the value of his property taken or damaged
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by the sovereign through the use of eminent
domain.***"
In the Eighth Circuit Court case of United States v. 3,698.63
Acres, Supra, the court upheld jury verdicts which were in excess
of the values placed upon land by the landowner's own appraisers.
One defendant obtained an award of $137, 500 after his expert witness
testified to damages of only $128, 000. Another defendant obtained
an award of $34, 500 as compared with his two experts' testimonies
of $32, 500 and $31, 450. In both instances two landowners had testified to figures in excess of the awards. One landowner had testified
that he arrived at his figures on the basis of
the land--what it's worth to m e . . . "

M

... mostly the use of

The Eighth Circuit Court of

Appeals said that, as a matter of law, it could not say that the owner1 s
opinions on land value wholly lacked weight.
In the Chavez case, Supra, the testimony of the landowner's
sole expert witness was stricken; and an award of $25, 000 was upheld
on the basis of a $35, 000 figure testified to by the landowner himself.
In another case recently before this court, Utah State Road
Commission v. Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 184, 478 P. 2d 507, the precise
issue was presented as exists in the instant case; and in ruling that
matter, this court stated:
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M

,. .Mr. Dillree, being an owner of the
property together with his wife, was a
competent witness as to the value of the
property taken and as to the severance
damages incurred.
In the light of the foregoing authorities, the testimony and
evidence adduced at the trial, there is no sound basis to hold that
the jury verdict in the instant action is unsupported by competent
and sufficient evidence and testimony,
CONCLUSION
A fundamental and basic factor to be considered in this matter
is that the appellant filed a motion for new trial subsequent to the
entry of the jury verdict. Judge Don V. Tibbs denied this motion.
The trial judge, having heard all of the evidence and having
observed the demeanor of the witnesses, is in a distinct advantageous
position to make a proper ruling with respect to the sufficiency of
the evidence, which is the only real issue and a matter particularly
within the province of the trial judge.
To contend that the verdict of the jury is not founded upon
sufficient evidence is to challenge the factual findings of the jury
and the trial judge.
We respectfully submit that the verdict and judgment should
be affirmed.
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Respectfully submitted,

BRANT II. WALL
Attorney for Respondents
Suite 500, Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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